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On March 30 1898, President McKinley wept while telling
a colleague of Congress7 attempt to force the U.S. into the
Spanish-American War. In a span of six weeks, beginning with the
sinking o f the Maine in Havana harbor, popular fervor had swelled
for an assertion of strength and courage befitting an emergent
world power. Yet, even after formal investigations revealed that
an external mine had triggered the explosion, McKinley continued
to advocate restraint in addressing the delicate situation in Cuba.
After months of spirited debate between dovish arbitrationists and
their jingoist counterparts, the latter succeeded in portraying
McKinley’s deliberation as a deficiency o f backbone. The curious
emphasis upon backbone epitomized the President as lacking a
decisive, forceful character, capable of enacting its will.1 Popular
criticism mounted, citing a lack of “manhood in the White House”
<2

that rendered its leadership “lame, halting, and impotent.”
McKinley took the critique to heart while Congress heeded the
nation’s call for war.
o
But not all of the spin was critical of McKinley’s reluctance
to act. His supporters staked the high ground, stressing the
President’s “great calmness” as superior to the jingoists’ desire for
“passion” and “revenge.”

Numerous arbitrationists applauded

1 Kristin Hoganson, Fighting fo r Am erican M anhood: How Gender Politics
P rovoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1998): 105, 90-2.

1

McKinley’s “firmness and strength of character” as dignified and
statesmanlike.3 For those still doubting McKinley’s deliberate
tack, advocates touted his “splendid record” as Civil War soldier in
further defense of his manhood and integrity.4

Despite these

efforts, McKinley’s abiding concern for public opinion, coupled
with a fear o f relinquishing control to Congress, led him to declare
war on April 25 to the approval of Capitol Hill and the nation at
large. Thus, after weeks of painful speculation in which he saw his
manhood and the political power of his nation placed under siege,
the exhausted President relented.

But McKinley’s acquiescence

was not an admission of cowardice; rather, it was a rational
accommodation of the changing climate he confronted.5
Why were men like McKinley so disconcerted by the
media campaigns preceding the Spanish-American War? It may
seem rash to affix a single answer to this loaded question.
Nonetheless, there is one explanation that warrants detailed
consideration.

Throughout the final decades of the nineteenth

century there was a crisis of manhood that transformed the male
ideal in America. Gail Bederman, in Manliness and Civilization,
credits this period with effecting a shift from the term “manliness”
to “masculinity” in characterizing turn-of -the-century manhood.

2 “Dollars versus Democracy,” New York Journal, March 8, 1898; Sen. George
Turner, Congressional Record, 31, pt. 4, April 14, 1898, 3827.
3 “Keeping Cool,” Baltimore Sun, March 1, 1898.
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The former implied a moral dimension of manhood as an
“honorable, highminded” ideal rooted in the Victorian attributes of
sexual restraint, a powerful will, and a strong character. The
emergent

masculine

ideal,

by

contrast,

represented

the

“characteristics o f the male sex” that differentiated men from
women. Beginning in the final decades of the nineteenth century,
this evolution o f convention yielded a male standard that
increasingly embraced “aggressiveness, physical force, and male
sexuality.”

Thus McKinley, representing the manly ideal of the

Civil War generation, encountered profound opposition from a
new generation that espoused a masculine ideal rooted in more
virile demonstrations o f manhood. As such, the assaults upon the
President’s manhood, viewed in the context of a changing male
paradigm, made war almost imperative to his effective leadership.6
Developments in the final decades of the nineteenth century
-the closing of the frontier, unprecedented immigration and the
emergence of industrial capitalism, and the advent of imperial

4 “The President’s Detainers,” Rochester D em ocrat and Chronicle, March 9,
1898.
5 Hoganson, Am erican M anhood, 106.
6 The Century Dictionary: An Encyclopedic Lexicon o f the English Language
(Century: New York, 1890), s.w . “masculine,” “manly.” Going a step ftirther,
Bederman’s use o f masculine to describe tum-of-the-century manhood is
invoked to differentiate between those things pertaining to men versus women,
for example, “masculine clothing,” a “masculine gait,” or “masculine
occupations.” The term therefore exists as a “relatively empty, fluid adjective
devoid o f moral or emotional meaning,” as quoted in Gail Bederman, M anliness
and Civilization: A Cultural H istory o f Gender and Race in the United States,
1880-1917, (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1995): 18-19. The term
m anhood, for the purposes o f this paper will be used as a neutral reference to the
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conquest— comprised the defining challenges of the young nation.7
Scholars like Bederman have recognized that a cross-over from
manly to masculine manhood took place throughout this period,
but explanations for how it happened have been conspicuously
lacking.

To help fill this void, I will explain how the

aforementioned challenges formed a nexus whereby masculinity
(

supplanted manliness in the psyche of American men. In charting
this transformation, I will explore how (1) anxiety wrought by the
closing of the frontier and (2) a changing political framework,
served to alienate men from past constructions of manhood.

In

light of these breaks from standards of manliness, I will conclude
by trying to demonstrate how this shift placed men, increasingly,
on a masculine trajectory of aggressive resistance to women’s
assertiveness, which emerged with greater scope and frequency at
the turn-of-the-century.

Post-Frontier Anxiety
When Frederick Jackson Turner announced the closing of
the American frontier to an assembly of historians at the 1893
Columbian Exposition in Chicago, he merely formalized what

male experience bereft o f the connotations attributed to m anly and masculine, as
set forth in my thesis.
7 John Whiteclay Chambers II, The Tyranny o f Change: A m erica in the
Progressive Era, 1890-1920, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992): 49.
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many scholars of his day already knew.8 By proceeding to attach
to the bygone frontier an end to “the first period of American
history,” however, he prompted his countrymen to think more
seriously o f what the event boded for the nation’s future. In an era
o f economic and political strife, Turner’s formal interpretation of
the 1890 census returns gave definition to a post-frontier anxiety
emergent in the final decades of the nineteenth century.

For

Turner and like-minded scholars, the settlement of the frontier
provided the key to America’s favorable development - “to the
evolution of American democracy.” As such, the frontier became
the cornerstone of American exceptionalism, just as its closing
concluded a unique chapter in the nation’s emergence.9
Turner believed that the frontier experience imparted the
defining traits of democracy. The process of western settlement,

8 Billington, Ray Allen. A m eric a ’s Frontier Heritage (Hinsdale: The Dryden
Press, 1966): 4-13. A b rief qualification of my use o f the term “frontier”: Since
the publication in 1894 of Turner’s monumental essay, “The Significance of the
Frontier in American History,” the meaning o f the term frontier has become a
matter of profound importance to historians of the American West. Turner’s
interpretation of the frontier experience, largely devoid of political conflict,
heralded American democracy and egalitarianism as paragons of human
progress. More recently, however, New Western Historian Patricia Limerick
has rejected the term altogether, asserting that when precisely defined, the term
is nationalistic and racist as it denotes regions where “white people get scarce.”
This criticism has helped supplant Turner’s idealized conception of the
American frontier by “admitting the hierarchies o f indenture, slavery, and class
differentiation” that accompanied America’s westward expansion. Trails:
Toward a New Western History, ed. Patricia Limerick, Charles Rankin, and
Clyde A. Milner II, (University Press o f Kansas, 1991). Despite the welcome
complications posed by intervening scholarship, the term remains essential to
my purposes as it assists in developing the historical dialogue especially
important to the first portion of this paper.
9 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in Am erican History, (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1976): 38. David M. Wrobel, The E n d o f Am erican
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Turner contended, “master[ed] the colonist.” To appreciate this
advance -“the men who grew up under these conditions, and the
political, economic and social results of it”- was to appreciate the
truly American part of the nation’s history. 10

In short, by

adapting to the material realities of the frontier, Americans became
a new cultural species as “organs in response” to a novel
environment, free from historical imitation.11 For Turner, then, the
frontier provided the unique stage upon which Americans learned
their most defining and noble characteristics.
The importance of the frontier to the nation’s development
brought a corresponding fear of its pending absence. A number of
social critics feared the looming end of the frontier in the final
decades o f the century and the theme permeated the periodical
literature o f the time.

The Nation noted the danger as early as

1880: “The great progress of this country has taken place within
the past twenty years, owing to the rapid settlement and cultivation
of Western lands; and we have been going on as if there were to be
no

exhaustion of the impelling force.”

With the rapid

disappearance o f land, the editorial continued: “At the present rate

Exceptionalism: Frontier Anxiety fro m the O ld West to the New Deal,
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993): vii-viii, 3-5.
10 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American
History, ” Proceedings o f the Forty-First Annual M eeting o f the State H istorical
Society o f Wisconsin (Madison, Wis., 1894): 81-2.
11 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Problem o f the West.” The Frontier in
A m erican History, (Huntington: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1976):
205-6.
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o f settlement the desirable free ‘homestead’ lands will probably all
be occupied before this decade has ended.” 12
This alarm continued into the 1890s when, just prior to
Turner’s proclamation, C. Wood Davis asked more specifically
what the closing of the frontier meant to the anxious nation:
When we reflect that the prime factor in the unexampled prosperity
of the United States, and our comparative freedom from many of
the social and economic problems long confronting Europe, has
been the existence of an almost unlimited area of fertile land to
which the unemployed could freely resort; that, practically, such
lands are now fully occupied, and that such occupancy has
occasioned a sudden halt in the westward movement of population
at the line found to the extreme western limit of profitable
agriculture, it may be well to inquire what changes are likely to
result from the exhaustion o f the tillable portion of the public
domain.13
For Davis, as for others, the imminent passing of the frontier and
its ameliorative function prompted widespread concern. Thus, by
the time o f Turner’s emergence a profound anxiety regarding the
nation’s loss of public lands was already in place.
Initially, Turner was less dour than his predecessors
regarding what the closing of the frontier meant for America. He
was convinced that “the legacy of a pioneering spirit of
competition and individualism would buoy citizens in a frontierless
America.” Turner cleaved to two elements capable of sustaining
American democracy in wake of the frontier’s passing. First, the
moral and political legacy of the frontier had imparted an abiding

12 “An Agricultural Outlook,” The Nation, XXXI (August 19, 1880): 127.
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ideological consensus, firmly rooted in the democratic ideals of the
nation.

This, Turner contended, would retain the virtues of the

frontier despite its absence. Second, Turner asserted that the West
and Midwest, by pursuit of their sectional interests, would preserve
the frontier as a potent force in representing regional politics.14 In
this sense, Turner’s death knell o f the frontier included a eulogy
that softened the loss of an era deemed critical to America’s
development.
But Turner’s optimism was soon eclipsed by a widespread
post-frontier anxiety. The heroes of Turner’s story were not the
“great captains” or men of “daring,” but rather “the small
entrepreneurs, artisans, and farmers, the little men in their average
and aggregate;”15 This broad agency gave the frontier experience
its distinctly democratic character. Likewise, it sowed the seeds
for anxiety in the wake of Turner’s proclamation. The close of the
nineteenth

century

witnessed

widespread

unemployment, and urban decay.

depression,

mass

American men had always

celebrated their democratic institutions, but now saw them flouted

13 Lee Benson, Turner and Beard: Am erican H istorical Writing Reconsidered
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960): 80.
14 Richard Etulain, Re-Imagining the M odern Am erican West: A Century o f
Fiction, History, and Art, (Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1996): 49;
Frederick Jackson Turner, “Contributions o f the West,” in The Frontier in
A m erican H istory, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962): 246-9;
“Dominant Forces in Western Life,” ibid., 235-40. It is worth noting that by the
early twentieth century Turner joined ranks with his more pessimistic colleagues
in fearing that the “rising urban-industrial United States, with mounting
bureaucratic centralization” had “broken its frontier moorings” and strayed from
its “nourishing and positive frontier legacies.” Etulain, Re-Imagining, 49.

by urban boss governments and anarchists.

Where they once

dreamed o f an America immune from violent industrial labor
conflicts, men now confronted a nightmare of railroad strikes
(1877), the Haymarket Square riot (1886), the Homestead Strike
(1892), and the Pullman Strike (1894), not to mention western
confrontations evident in the gold-mining strikes at Coeur d’Alene
and at Cripple Creek (1892-94), and Coxey’s Army (1894). Thus
even before he spoke them, Turner’s assurances of the residual
effect o f the frontier rang hollow.16
With one of the factors that had spurred the nation’s growth
evaporating, Americans of the late-nineteenth century concluded
that the other -large-scale immigration— was no longer beneficial. •
For decades immigrants had proven critical in pushing the frontier
further west. They fueled railroad and canal construction, supplied
man-power to nascent industries, and, in general, satisfied the
country’s demand for unskilled labor.

However, as Western

homesteads grew increasingly scarce and urban decay spread
throughout the East, nativists increasingly identified their foreignborn counterparts as scapegoats for many of the nation’s problems.
This discontent sharpened by the 1880’s and 1890’s in
response to demographic changes in U.S. immigration that featured

15 Richard Slotkin. Gunfighter Nation: The M yth o f the Frontier in TwentiethCentury A m erica (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993): 34.
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a swell o f southern and eastern Europeans.
immigrants

troubled

many

Americans

by

These “new”
their

perceived

differences. Generally, they were poorer than their predecessors,
which exacerbated the decay of urban centers.

Likewise, their

disproportionately Catholic and Jewish composition posed threats
to an otherwise Protestant society. Moreover, they were largely
unskilled and uneducated; their ignorance of American convention
threatened to drive down wages while diluting democratic
institutions.

Above all, they looked different; they were not

Anglo-Saxons and, as such, they represented a different “race.”17
It is important to note how the timing of anti-immigration
hysteria

coincided

with

a

widespread

anxiety

about

the

disappearance o f the frontier. In the 1880’s and 1890’s new social,
economic, and political pressures combined with perceptions of a
dwindling public domain to prompt concerns regarding the ability
of America to Americanize its new arrivals.

As the issues

converged, a growing number questioned whether or not an
unchecked right of immigration represented “an abstract theory”
for whose sake the country was “sacrificing [its] great advantage of

16 Henry Steele Commager, The Am erican M ind: A n Interpretation o f American
Thought and Character Since the 1 8 8 0 ’s (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1950)1:41-54.
17 Maldwyn Allen Jones, Am erican Im migration (Chicago: The University o f
Chicago Press, I960): 37, 178-183, 192-193, 230, 257. For a nuanced treatment
o f Manifest Destiny in the U.S. as a gradual shift from a celebration o f superior
institutions based on historical innovations of the “Anglo-Saxon” peoples, to
that of the innate superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, see Reginald Horsman,
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elbow room [while] risking [its] national character.”18

This

confluence gave rise to less democratic solutions to the problems
confronting the nation, a process that likewise prompted a fresh
construction o f American manhood.
As already suggested, Turner’s frontiersman mirrored
Jefferson’s husbandman as “the rock upon which the American
republic [or, in Turner’s case, the democratic ideal] st[ood].” The
western settler, situated in isolation, embodied Jefferson’s “rural
virtue” while transforming the wild into the agrarian.19 This model
approximated the honor-virtue of the manly ideal in mid
nineteenth century America.

By the final decades of the century,

however, the closing of the frontier and resultant anxieties linked
to immigration gave way to a more aggressive construction of
manhood.
Perhaps no one embodied this turn toward masculinity
better than Teddy Roosevelt.

He entered the political scene in

1882, at age twenty-three, as an assemblyman from Albany, New
York.

Almost immediately, Roosevelt realized that in order to

play ‘a man’s part’ in politics he would need to overhaul his
image. Newspapers ridiculed hi's effeminate voice and aristocratic

Race and M anifest Destiny: The Origins o f Am erican R acial Anglo-Saxonism,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).
18 John Havvkes Noble, “The Present State o f the Immigration Question,”
Political Science Quarterly, VII (June, 1892): 243.
19 Annette Kolodny, The Lay o f the Land: M etaphor as Experience and History
in Am erican Life and Letters, (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina
Press, 1975): 27.
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dress by contriving aliases such as “weakling,” “Jane-Dandy,” and
“Punkin-Lily” to stunt his lofty aspirations.20

Undaunted,

Roosevelt invoked a successful public relations campaign to
transform his perception as “dude” in becoming the “quintessential
symbol

o f turn-of-the

century

masculinity.”

Roosevelt’s

bildungsroman featured his retreat to South Dakota following the
tragic death of his wife in 1884 and, more importantly, the
adoption o f a new discourse of civilization, which became a
hallmark of his political career.
Bederman’s scholarship is of use here. She identifies the
nineteenth century discourse o f civilization as a highly variable
dialogue with the potential to serve the interests of numerous social
groups. At its root, the discourse sought to answer what behaviors
and assumptions, on the part of individuals and society as a whole,
were worthy of the term, civilized.

Despite its broad potential,

civilization tended to be construed so as to maintain the class,
gender, race, and political authority of middle- and upper-class
white, American men.

Nonetheless, because civilization was

subject to the vicissitudes of a broader dialogue, it became more “a
process of articulation” than a set of fixed formulations or points.
Its lack of definition left the discourse open to constant challenge.
Conservative chauvinists, militant feminists, white racists, and

20 Edmund Morris, The Rise o f Theodore R oosevelt (New York: Ballantine,
1979): 159-83; Mark Sullivan, Our Times: The United States 1900-1925 (New
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black resisters all sought to increase their power by shaping the
discourse of civilization to best meet their needs. As Bederman
points out, the importance of civilization was not what it meant so
much as how participants in its discourse used it to “legitimize”
wide-ranging claims to power 21
For Roosevelt, civilization’s cultural power derived from
linking beliefs about gender, race and millennialism. By yoking
male supremacy to white supremacy and defending both as critical
to human perfection amidst the Darwinian struggle, civilization
presented male power as both “natural and inevitable.” Roosevelt
viewed American men as actors in a millennial drama of
“advancement” vis a vis their “racial inferiors.” To demonstrate
this “virility as a race and nation,” Roosevelt implored American
men to take up the ‘strenuous life’ and strive to advance
civilization - “through racial violence if necessary.”22 Roosevelt
fused manliness and masculinity by rendering honor synonymous
with aggression in spurring American men to wage an international
battle for “racial supremacy.”

York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1927): 226-230.
21 Bederman, M anliness and Civilization, 23.
22 ibid., 23-7, 171. Roosevelt defined the “strenuous life” as a “life o f toil and
effort, of labor and strife; ... that highest form of success which comes, not to the
man who desires mere easy peace, but to the man who does not shrink from
danger, from hardship, or from bitter toil, and who out o f these wins the
splendid ultimate triumph.” Theodore Roosevelt, speech before the Hamilton
Club, Chicago, April 10, 1899, published in The Strenuous Life: Essays and
A ddresses, (New York: The Century Co., 1911): 1.
23 Bederman, M anliness and Civilization, 25-27; The stakes o f Roosevelt’s
civilization requirement were evident in his later statement: “Courage, hard
work, self mastery, and intelligent effort are essential to a successful life... Only
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The frontier of the American West provided the object
lesson in Roosevelt’s civilization discourse.

Whereas Turner’s

frontier stressed independence in learning manly, democratic
virtues, Roosevelt’s highlighted the masculine duty to assert one’s
self on behalf of civilization. The challenge for Roosevelt came in
linking a legacy of competitive traits to the frontier. He served this
end, in part, by celebrating the hunt as a metaphor for American
success.

For Roosevelt hunting provided a “training school for

war,” which honed the frontiersman’s skills and explained his
success vis a vis the Indians.

For Roosevelt, then, the frontier

ceased to be a mere safety valve and instead became a virile
proving ground for civilized manhood.
In addition to his

94

‘race-war’ fantasies,

Roosevelt’s

civilization project contained an explicit class-bias. The social ills
that accompanied the influx of new immigrants indicated that
civilization could no longer be a function of American identity, but
rather American process.

Since the frontier provided the

mechanism of Americanization, it followed that only participants
in that experience could identify themselves as “the distinctive and
intensely American stock.” This distinguished the frontier persona

those are fit to live who do not fear to die and none are fit to die who have
shrunk from the joy o f life and the duty o f life.” Donna Haraway, “Teddy Bear
Patriarchy: Taxidermy in the Garden o f Eden, New York City, 1908-1936,” in
Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World o f M odern Science,
(New York: Routledge, 1989), 26-58.
24 Theodore Roosevelt, The Wilderness Hunter. Works, II, (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1926): 7-13.
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from

its

more

passive

counterpart,

the

eastern

agrarian.

Roosevelt’s equation thus laid the groundwork for class division
on the basis of western enterprise versus eastern subordination.25
In this sense, Roosevelt’s construction of civilization
mirrors Annette Kolodny’s gendered interpretation of both
psychological and cultural development by which the ambivalent
child (or civilization) seeks to differentiate itself from the mother.
She asserts:
[the child] repeat[s] a movement back into the realm of the Mother,
in order to begin again, and then an attempted (and not always
successful) movement out of that containment in order to
experience the self as independent, assertive, and sexually active.
Where the maternal embrace is not so overwhelming as to thwart
that movement the [child] either erupts with an expression of
violence -as the seductive embrace is rejected- or with guilt, as
[he] begins to perceive what has resulted from the single-minded
cultivation and mastery of the virgin continent.26
For Roosevelt civilization in America required the frontier’s
essential themes of “regeneration through regression, isolation, and
savage war.”

Moreover, the spoils of this civilizing process fell

disproportionately to those who rejected society’s maternal
embrace through active aggression.
No cultural medium exemplified Roosevelt’s civilization
project and its response to frontier anxiety quite like the genre of
the Western, which emerged with renewed vigor at the turn-of-the-

25 Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning o f the West, 4 vols. (New York: G.
Putnam’s Sons, 1889-1896): III, 96-7; Slotkin, Gunfighter, 49-50.
26 Kolodny, The Lay o f the Land, 153.
27 Slotkin, Gunfighter, 44.
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century. Precursors to the Western existed in the stories of Janies
Fenimore Cooper, Washington Irving, Francis Parkman, and a host
of other literary talents.

But intervening changes in the eastern

perception of the West’s civilizing function -due largely to
Roosevelt’s efforts- gave fresh import to the tum-of-the-century
Western.28 Likewise, it reflects the growing challenges facing
turn-of-the-century men and the manifestation of these challenges
in the masculine attributes of the genre.

Because Owen Wister

maintained extensive personal and ideological dialogue with
Roosevelt and, likewise, because his novel, The Virginian, is
widely-recognized as setting a new course for the Western, his
contribution provides a fitting characterization of the genre as a
whole.

The work features a persistent rejection o f society’s

encroachment upon male agency, a trademark thereafter ensconced
in the Western pantheon.
The inspiration for the novel hails from dilemmas in the
author’s life.
Owen Wister was, for all practical purposes, an eastern dude. The
child o f a troubled marriage, he spent much of his life appeasing
the “fierce energy” of his mother and the vocational prescriptions

28 For a more thorough discussion o f the Eastern Establishment’s changing view
o f the western frontier and the altered literary expressions that accompanied it,
consult G. Edward White, The Eastern Establishment and the Western
Experience: The West o f Frederic Remington, Theodore Roosevelt, and Owen
Wister, (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1989): 31-50.
29 Jane Tompkins, West o f Everything: The Inner Life o f Westerns, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992): 131.
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o f his father, which led him to abandon his first love, music.30
After a brief foray into business, in 1885 Wister defied his father
by moving west to undertake a career in writing. Soon after, he set
his literary talents to vanquishing his remaining ghost, the stifling
dictates of his mother.31 Wister’s resistance to his mother was
evident in his equation of her with all the West was not - “society,
art, manners, taste, inherited wealth, good breeding, [and] a life of
leisure in exquisite surroundings.” These traits coincided perfectly
with the excesses Wister, like his protagonist, needed to shed in
becoming the consummate westerner.32
The narrative of The Virginian extends Wister’s issues with
his mother to society as a whole.

The Virginian’s wife, Molly,

provides the trope for his dismissal of the East’s overly feminine
character. Molly represents genteel class snobbery manifest in an
ideology of “egalitarianism” that connotes for Wister the
“emasculated and intellectually exhausted American upper class.”
The Virginian’s courtship of Molly is thus played out as an
ideological contest between the “quality” and “equality” elements
of the American character, a la Roosevelt’s enterprising and

30 Darwin Payne, Owen Wister: Chronicler o f the West, Gentleman o f the East
(Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1985): 16, 58-9, 109-11.
31 ibid., 59.
32 Tompkins, West o f Everything, 143.
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subordinate classes.33 The essence o f this social order emerges in
the Virginian’s commentary:
It was through the Declaration of Independence that we
acknowledged the eternal inequality of man. For by it we
abolished a cut-and-dried aristocracy. We had seen little men
artificially held up in high places, and great men artificially held
down in low places, and our own justice-loving hearts abhorred
this violence to human nature. Therefore, we decreed that every
man should thenceforth have equal liberty to find his own level.
By this very decree we acknowledged and gave freedom to true
aristocracy, saying “Let the best man win, whoever he is.” Let the
best man win! That is America’s word. That is true democracy.
And true democracy and true aristocracy are one and the same
thing. I f anybody cannot see this,'-so much the worse for his
eyesight.34

With a glaring lack of subtlety, Molly becomes the equality of the
old aristocracy in Wister’s class equation.
The

triumph

of Wister’s

quality

over

equality

is

consummated when the Virginian prevails over Molly in an
extended courtship that pits the one against the other. The climax
of this struggle emerges late in the novel when the hero asserts ,
independence from the high-minded ideals o f the heroine by
defying her ultimatum that he desist from a duel with the villain
Trampas, or lose her as a result. The Virginian, however, shirks
this call to female sensibility and Molly’s boldness undermines her
egalitarian agenda as Trampas falls and the Virginian remains, “by
love and [Molly’s] surrender to him .. .more than ever she could be,

33 Slotkin, G unfighter Nation, 175-79.
34 Owen Wister, The Virginian: A Horseman o f the Plains, Edited by Philip
Durham. (Boston: HoughtonM iflin Company, 1968): 93.
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with all that she had.”35

This inversion of the societal code,

featuring a male persona in active defiance of feminine
sensibilities, became a defining trait of the Western genre, a
cultural medium that persisted throughout the twentieth century in
fortifying the masculine ideal of American manhood.36
Frontier anxiety in the late nineteenth century arose from a
dwindling public domain and the attendant perception that
America could no longer Americanize its own, particularly the
growing tide of ill-perceived immigrants. The transitory climate
that resulted allowed men like Teddy Roosevelt to alter the
discourse of civilization to accommodate a new class of
individuals who, by aggression, asserted themselves atop a revised
social hierarchy. Although Roosevelt implied male agency in this
new formula, the Western made this point explicit. For his part,
Wister solidified the Western as a potent cultural medium by
reinforcing

male

agressiveness.

Consequently,

women

in

c

Westerns became symbols of eastern excess with limited relevance
to the demands of the West, and hence, civilization in general.
Thus for men as a whole, the closing of the frontier set off a chain
of developments that helped undermine the manly ideal of mid

35 ibid., 272.
36 For a thorough and compelling discussion o f the core attributes of the Western
genre and how it functioned as a male response to social change, see Tompkins,
West o f Everything.
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nineteenth century manhood. Masculinity emerged, in part, to help
fill this void.

An Altered Political Framework
Having discussed frontier anxiety and its transforming
effect upon American manhood, I will now highlight the effect of
the changing political framework of the late-nineteenth century1in
reinforcing the same.

The rise of democratic conservatism

throughout the latter-half of the nineteenth century spurred this
political transformation. It began as a seed, long resting in the
American soil, that germinated in the theories and legal doctrines
of William

Graham

Sumner

and

Justice

Stephen

Field,

respectively, before blooming alongside America’s growing
embrace of industrial capitalism.

By the turn of the century,

industrial capitalism’s insistence upon

property rights had

undermined the Jeffersonian tradition’s embrace of individual
honor.37 As such, the shift afforded workers, and hence men,
fewer options in maintaining the manly ideal and its emphasis
upon individual self-worth. The aggressive response of American
men, evident in outbreaks like the Homestead Strike, reflected the

37 Put simply, the Jeffersonian tradition’s preference for individual honor is most
evident in the founder’s language of the Declaration o f Independence: “all men
are created equal, with certain unalienable rights... among th[em] are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” This profound statement o f American
egalitarianism served to bolster the standing of the average American man for
over a century before coming under attack in the mid-nineteenth century by
democratic conservatives’ overarching concern for property rights.
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growing appeal o f a more masculine concept of American
manhood.

In April of 1897, over a decade after Ulysses S. Grant, the storied
Civil War veteran and former President, died, a host of fellow
veterans and citizens gathered in New York for the formal
dedication of his tomb.

The scandal of souvenir dealing that

accompanied the event provided a fitting paradox of both Grant
and the age in general -his selfless service to country on the one
hand, and his political corruption on the other.38 The disgrace
prompted the Civil War generation to wonder if its successors
cared more about moneymaking than the virtue of their
predecessors. 3 9 They implored Americans to follow the example
of veterans who had forsaken “private ambition, selfishness, and
greed of gain” for public service.40 The call went unheralded,
however, as citizens not only failed to follow suit, but enacted
subsequent reforms that deemed pensions for un-needy veterans an
unreasonable burden for taxpayers.41
The rebuff was telling.

The mid-nineteenth century’s

unpredictable economy demanded a strong character rooted in self-

38 Hoganson, Am erican M anhood, 28.
39 Charles Reagan Wilson, Baptized in Blood: The Religion o f the Lost Cause
1865-1920, (Athens: University o f Georgia Press, 1980): 8.
40 James A. Tawney, Memorial Day speech, 1895, as quoted in Hoganson,
Am erican M anhood, 28.
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restraint as a prerequisite for men to make their living. Men were
granted or refused credit based on assessments of their character.
Credit raters like Dim and Bradstreet evaluated prospective
borrowers on their track records of keeping their word and
providing for their families.42 This emphasis upon self-restraint
encouraged young men to work hard and live frugally in order to
amass sufficient capital for a small business capable of supporting
a family in moderate comfort.43 In short, mid nineteenth-century
America espoused an ideal of manliness rooted in individual
honor.
By the 1890s, however, manly virtue was no longer
synonymous with male identity. The manly ideal had evolved in a
crucible of small-scale capitalism, fast receding by the 1890s. In
the “corporatized and bureaucratized” society that accompanied
the rise o f industrial capitalism, manly self-restraint brought
diminishing returns.

Amidst this transformation the prospect of'

individual enterprise for the American male took a hit. The sudden
explosion of entry-level work throughout the economy meant that

41 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and M others: The Political Origins o f
Social Policy in the United States, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press o f Harvard
University Press, 1992): 2.
42 Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Fam ily Fortunes: M en and Women o f
the English M iddle Class, 1780-1850 (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press,
1987): 207-8. Although Fam ily Fortunes charts English middle-class fomiation,
its observations, particularly those regarding the significance o f manliness in
class identification, are relevant to class formation in the United States; Mary P.
Ryan, Cradle o f the M iddle Class: The Family in Oneida County, New York,
1790-1865, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 140-42.
43 ibid., 165-85.
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men entering the workforce could expect fewer promotions to
responsible, more lucrative management positions.44 As such,
manly self-denial and -discipline became less profitable. The old
ideal echoed its imperatives of hard work and independence, but to
limited avail, as manly restraint yielded to masculine aggression in
the resulting frustration of American males. For the most part,
Americans viewed the 1890s as a dreadful transition from “a
simple self-contained, predominantly agrarian society to a more
complex, increasingly urban, and industrial one.”45 The gravity of
this shift, then, required the reformulation of basic democratic
principles to prove justifiable.
Beginning in 1872, with his ascendance to a Chair of
Political and Social Science at Yale, William Graham Sumner set
to re-working basic assumptions about democracy in a manner
conducive to industrial capitalism.

Sumner’s project drew upon

ideas already fixed in American consciousness by noteworthy
theorists like Locke, Darwin, and Spencer. But his genius lay in
resolving inconsistencies at a high point of American anxiety by
imparting an invigorating gloss to existing thought. For Sumner,
rights, liberty, and equality, provided the touchstones in this
reformulation of American democracy.

Consistent with his

44 Stuart M.Blumin, The Em ergence o f the M iddle Class: Social Experience in
the Am erican City, 1760-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989):
290-5; Peter G. Filene, Him/Her/Self: Sex Roles in M odern Am erica, (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986): 70-3.
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conservative objectives, they assumed meanings in contrast to their
erstwhile

counterparts

under

the

Jeffersonian

tradition.

Accordingly, they formed a sturdy ledge for resting property
rights, the shibboleth of the Gilded Age.
For Sumner, the idea that rights were a part of man’s
natural heritage, as promulgated by natural rights philosophers,
was an “exploded superstition.” In his opinion, the ideal primitive
condition never even existed.46 Rights could not be held in nature,
Sumner contended, because nature offered nothing save the
opportunity for extracting a living insofar as the individual was
capable. Bereft of their natural foundation, rights became social
constructs, or, “rules of the game” subject to given circumstances.
47 They were contingent upon the individual and far from absolute,
derived from common sense and the applied wisdom o f “actual
life” experience.48 Thus for Sumner rights were defensible not as
moral entitlements, but as societal endorsements of material
acquisition.
Liberty likewise lacked moral validity for Sumner.

The

notion of primitive man’s freedom was a fiction, he believed,
because nature was more accurately a state of slavery. Lacking the

45 H.A. Pierce, “A Review o f Finance and Business,” B a n k er’s M agazine
(February 1894): 563-67, as cited in Wrobel, Am erican Exceptionalism, 53.
46 William Graham Sumner, Earth-H unger and Other Essays (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1913): 131.
47 ibid., 83.
48 William Graham Sumner, Folkways (Boston: The Athenaeum Press, 1906):
29.
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technology to ease the requirements of subsistence, the savage’s
life was consumed in struggle.49 Absolute liberty in doing what
one pleased was thus impossible because nature demanded that all
privileges be offset by the acceptance of inexorable restraints upon
the individual. Therefore liberty “in the highest and best sense,”
applied only to individual work and achievement. Hence liberty,
like rights, extended only as far as society’s defense o f capital
accumulation.50
Finally, with regard to equality, Sumner was still more
skeptical o f the liberal democratic tradition’s dependence upon
natural rights. He echoed Roosevelt and Wister in asserting that
universal equality was “the purest falsehood., .ever put into human
language.”51 Because all differ in tastes, talents, and powers, even
“pure equality before the law [was] impossible.”

For Sumner,

creating the illusion of equality in either status or material
possessions constituted a disruption of societal advance, thereby
undermining the foundation upon which society stood.52

The

similarities between Sumner and Wister -as far as natural rights
are concerned— are evident in the latter’s aforementioned disdain
for the “violence to human nature” resulting from “little men”

49 Sumner, Earth-Hunger, 139,
50 ibid., 149-50.
51 ibid, 88
52 William Graham Sumner, The Challenge o f Facts and Other Essays, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1914): 44.
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being “artificially held up in high places” while “great men” are
relegated to “low places” under the liberal democratic formula.53
Without much imagination, one sees how Sumner’s
formulation of democracy formed a wholesale indictment of the
liberal democratic tradition and its notion of rights rooted in a state
of nature. As Robert Green McCIoskey elaborates:
The Jeffersonian theory of democracy was based upon spiritual
and
humane,
rather
than
material
and
economic,
values... [Jefferson’s] chief interests, in short, were the ‘rights’ of
the individual to realize his moral personality, and not the rights to
buy, sell, and prosper economically...When he used the term
“liberty,” the early democrat meant, first of all, freedom of
conscience -moral liberty- rather than freedom of business
enterprise... [Finally,] when the revolutionary democrat spoke of
equality, he was concerned primarily with an essential equality of
men before God, a sharing by all in the same basic humanness. 4

In this sense, Sumner’s gloss of rights, liberty, and equality
t

represented a new interpretation of democracy’s core values that
effectively “materializ[ed]... community value standards” within
the liberal democratic tradition.55

In all respects, Sumner’s

formulae favored industrial capitalism and its implicit reliance
upon private property.56 His shrewd logic wrought cracks in the
political foundation whereby individual worth fell subject to
material acquisition. The transformation helped grease a slippery
slope that promoted men’s slide from a tradition of honor wherein

53 Wister, The Virginian, 93.
54 Robert Green McCIoskey, Am erican Conservatism in the A ge o f Enterprise
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951): 2-3.
ibid., 20.
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they held greater control over the terms o f their labor, and hence
lives, in falling subject to a more conservative framework that
emphasized property rights.
But the mere articulation of conservative ideals was not
enough to transform the political framework of late-nineteenth
century America. Although Sumner’s logic found currency among
a growing segment of the populace, in order to prevail, it required
acceptance by the political structure it sought to revise.

At the

time Sumner began his post at Yale, both the Constitution and
Supreme Court’s resistance to democratic conservatism were
stolid. But their resistance was short- lived as the high court soon
yielded to interpretations more consistent with Sumner’s ideas.
Accordingly, the public interest, once secure under the liberal
democratic tradition,

fell increasingly

subject to individual

property rights. The career of Justice Stephen J. Field provides a
compelling link in this evolution of American conservatism.
Nineteenth century conservatives believed the judiciary,
not the popularly elected branches of federal government, should
arbitrate the claims of conflicting groups in balancing the “rights of
individuals, the sanctity of private property, and the welfare of the
community.”

57

Supreme Court Justice Field seized upon this ethos

and invoked Sumner’s materialist values in writing legal opinions

56 Edwin Mims, The M ajority o f the People (New York: Modem Age Books,
1941): 213-221.
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that, over time, elevated the entrepreneur at the expense of
majority rule.

He began as a dissenting minority, but through

persistence and the growing pro-capitalist sentiments of the Gilded
Age, prevailed in yoking his conservative bias to the Court’s
defining authority of judicial review.

58

Field’s accomplishment originated in his dissenting opinion
in the Slaughter-House Cases of 1873,

In 1869 the Louisiana

legislature passed a law incorporating the Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing and Slaughterhouse Company. This law required that all
butchering o f animals in New Orleans be conducted at the facilities
of the Crescent City Company to allow state officials to better
regulate the health and safety of the community. Local butchers
brought suit as the laws resulted in higher slaughter fees.

The

issue before the Court was whether the state law violated the
property rights of local butchers under the privileges and
immunities clause of the 14th Amendment, which asserts that “no
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” In a 5 to
4 decision, the Court upheld the Louisiana law.
Justice Samuel F. Miller, arguing for the majority,
interpreted the privileges and immunities clause narrowly in stating
that it pertained to select rights of national citizenship -property

57 Chambers II, Tyranny o f Change, 41.

28

not among them- that states could not abridge.

Furthermore,

Miller argued that the purpose of the 14th Amendment (enacted
after the Civil War) was to protect the rights of African Americans
and not expand the rights of whites. Field dissented, arguing that
property rights were in fact among the privileges and immunities
protected from state interference by the 14th Amendment. Three
colleagues joined Field in contending that the Louisiana law
violated the amendment by depriving butchers of property without
due process o f the law.

Moreover, all the dissenting justices

rejected the Court’s argument that the amendment was designed to
protect only the rights of black Americans.59
The importance of the Court’s interpretation of the
privileges and immunities clause in the Slaughterhouse Cases can
not be underestimated.

From the standpoint of manliness and

masculinity, the matter held special significance. The real question
was whether, the federal government should protect the general
interest in public health or a company’s specific interest in
unrestrained property rights. If the former, then men could retain a
political framework compatible with manliness. The manly ideal,
rooted as it was in self-restraint and strength of character, required
a political culture capable of reinforcing these attributes; the public

58 Robert Green McCIoskey, Am erican Conservatism in the A ge o f Enterprise
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951): 72-7.
59 W est’s Encyclopedia o f American Law, vol.. 9, (St. Paul: West Group, 1998):
273; Slaughter-H ouse Cases, 16 Wallace 36 (1873).
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good was an important expression of this ability. By contrast, if
government proved incapable of safeguarding the public good,
men might take this responsibility upon themselves. This would
require foregoing manliness in favor of masculinity in defending
more forcibly their interests against the property interests of the
few. In this sense, the tenuous majority in the Slaughterhouse
decision placed the manly ideal in a precarious position.
Although Field’s dissent, by definition, implied a set-back
to his conservative cause, subsequent decisions revealed the
opposite, placing the manly ideal in further jeopardy. Munn v.
Illinois (1877) brought the issue of property rights before the Court
once again as the first in a series known as the Granger Cases.
These suits dealt with issues resulting from the rapid growth of
manufacturing and transportation interests following the Civil War.
A number o f these companies featured railroad concerns and
operators of sizeable grain warehouses who abused their near
absolute control over hauling and storage by charging exorbitant
prices to farmers. To counter this leverage, farmers developed a
politically

powerful

cooperative,

or

Grange.

The group

successfully lobbied state legislatures in the Midwest to pass laws
regulating prices, railroads, warehouses, and public utilities, all
tied to the transport and storage of grain.
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The railroads and grain warehouses brought suit in the
courts, claiming the state regulations were unconstitutional. They
rested their complaint on the laws’ abridgement of Congress’s
right to regulate interstate commerce, their violation of the
Constitution’s prohibition against interfering with contracts, and
their violation of the 14th Amendment in depriving businesses of
their liberty and property without due process.

The M unn case

thus posed a clear and important question for a nation with rapidly
developing industries:

Did the Constitution permit a state to

regulate privately owned businesses?60
Justice Waite, again writing for the majority, ruled in favor
of the states by upholding the Granger laws. But rather than rest
his decision on the valid grounds that no constitutional question
had been raised, he held instead that the businesses in question
were subject to regulation because their operations “affected
[them] with a public interest.”

Justice Field again dissented,

arguing as he had in the Slaughterhouse Cases against the
majority’s invasion of private property rights, which he said were
protected against state power by the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment. The assertion reinforced his belief that “state police
power” could not be used to regulate private businesses.61

60 Thomas T. Lewis and Richard L. Wilson, ed., Encyclopedia o f the U.S.
Suprem e Court, vol. II, (Pasadena: Salem Press, 2001): 631-2.
61McCloskey, Am erican Conservatism, 79; M unn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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Munn v. Illinois represented another slight to Field’s
conservative project, but with an important exception. Unlike four
years earlier, the majority was now willing to accept that the
Constitution should acknowledge some limitations upon the states’
regulation of private property.

The recklessness. of a contrary

interpretation was accepted, “and the basic premise that the
property right is ultimate” was now “fuzzily” embraced.62 Proof of
this development emerged a decade later when, in the unanimous
decision, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., the
federal courts granted corporations standing as “persons” under the
14th Amendment. In a tribute to his persistence and the nation’s
growing embrace of capitalism, Field’s earlier dissents hit pay-dirt
as Sumnerian conservatism at last permeated the American
Constitutional tradition.
The Santa Clara decision resulted from the state of
California’s attempts to collect taxes owed by the Southern Pacific
and Central Pacific railroads.

Advocates for the railroad

companies claimed, as had the petitioners in Munn, that the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment made the state tax against
them unconstitutional for depriving them of property without due
process.

The question before the Court was whether a

corporation’s rights were defensible in the same way as a person’s.

62 McCIoskey, Am erican Conservatism, 79-80.
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The Court did not directly address the 14th Amendment
issue in its opinion. Signaling a major shift in the Court’s thinking,
Chief Justice Waite asserted even before hearing oral arguments
th

that the jurists would not deal with the question of whether 14

Amendment equal protection applied to corporations. They were
already “o f the opinion that it d[id].” Having thus established that
corporations would henceforth enjoy legal standing as “persons,”
the Court proceeded on the narrow issue o f whether the state of
California could tax fences on the railroad companies’ property.
The jurists decided unanimously against the state, ruling that its tax
laws constituted a violation of corporate rights under due process.
Hence the Santa Clara decision amounted to a de facto validation
o f Field’s conservative logic. By using the due process guarantees
o f the 14th Amendment, the resulting opinion confirmed that
corporation lawyers were now able to protect businesses from
numerous state regulations put forward on behalf of the public
good.63
In many respects, the conservative project of William
Graham Sumner and Justice Stephen J. Field mirrored the
civilization discourse of Teddy Roosevelt and Owen Wister; both
elevated private enterprise above universal equality. But there were
critical differences. Whereas Roosevelt and Wister drew upon the

53 W est’s Encyclopedia o f Am erican Law, 118-9; Santa Clara Co. v. Southern
Pacific R ailroad Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
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unique and demanding environment of the frontier as the agent in
distinguishing society’s ‘quality’ from its ‘equality,’ Sumner and
Field suggested a new ‘frontier’ of industrial capitalism in
effectively doing the same, with private property the gauge of
individual enterprise.

Proving one’s masculinity by meeting the

requirements of the rugged West was adapted to the industrial East
in a transformation that protected private property rights and —by
implication— the subordination o f labor in validating a privileged
entrepreneurial class.

“The health o f [this] new corporate order

required the willing subordination of worker to manager,” and of
public interest to “corporate necessity.”64

In this sense,

civilization’s traditional emphasis of restraint fell, increasingly, to
a Rooseveltian discourse emphasizing the vigor, in this case, of
eastern entrepreneurs. Thus in a new political framework where
workers lost autonomy to close supervision, they struggled to
preserve a sense of personal significance.65 Masculine expressions
emerged on both sides of the material divide as the enterprising

64 Slotkin, Gunfighter, 19.
65 Chambers, Tyranny, 34-5. Although his ideas were not popularized 'until his
publication of The Principles o f Scientific M anagem ent in 1911, industrial
engineer Frederick Taylor presented “time-and-motion” studies as a scientific
justification for what became industry’s decisive control over labor. Promoting
a managerial hierarchy that highlighted efficiency, Taylor’s findings separated
“the mental component o f commodity production from the manual,” thereby
further depriving the worker of honor within his profession. David
Montgomery, The F all o f the House o f Labor: The Workplace, the State, and
Am erican Labor, (Cambridge: The Press Syndicate o f the University o f
Cambridge, 1987): 251, 252.
65 W illiam Serrin, Homestead: The Glory and Tragedy o f an Am erican Steel
Town, (New York: Times Books, 1992): 70-3.
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and subordinate classes clashed in defense of their interests within
an altered political climate.
The Homestead

Strike of 1892 helps illustrate the

displacement of manliness by masculinity in the working class of
the late-nineteenth century.

It demonstrates not only the

difficulties workers faced in setting the terms of their labor, but
also the aggressiveness that followed. In June the Carnegie Steel
Company, the world’s largest steel manufacturer, refused to renew
the union contract governing its central plant in Homestead,
Pennsylvania. After members of the Amalgamated Association of
Iron and Steel Workers, representing the plant’s skilled workers,
refused to dissolve their union, the company locked out the entire
3,800-man work force.66 On July 5 it imported 300 Pinkerton
guards to enforce its plan to commence operations with nonunion
labor.
In the wee hours of the following morning, worker lookouts
spotted barges carrying guards up the Monongahela River,
prompting a militant reaction that captured national attention.
When the Pinkertons landed in hopes of securing the plant so it
could be operated by replacements, shooting broke out on both
sides and casualties quickly mounted.67 The unionists had a better
strategic position and, firing from behind makeshift fortifications

35

on higher ground, they effectively trapped the guards. Workers
bombarded the Pinkertons with cannons, a flaming railroad car,
and volleys of dynamite and fireworks. Their relentlessness paid
off as soon after the Pinkertons surrendered amid promises they
would not be harmed. But despite the best efforts of union leaders
to ensure their safety, the guards ran a gauntlet of infuriated
workers and townspeople who insulted, beat, and humiliated them
as they proceeded out of town.68
In spite of their spirited battle the Homestead workers lost
the war. Horrified by the unrest, Pennsylvania Governor Robert
Pattison ordered the state militia to occupy the town, which it ruled
through October in cooperation with Carnegie Steel.69 By the time
the troops left, the mill had resumed production with non-union
labor, forcing the workers to end the strike.70 Though a dramatic
showing, the feeble position of unionists was evident in the profits
the company gathered despite the tumult.

For that year, the

company netted $4 million and, by 1899, having weathered the
storm of union resistance, Carnegie Steel was averaging a cool $30
million. James H. Bridge, a Carnegie scholar, surmised the strike’s
significance in terms friendly to industry. No longer would “the
method of apportioning the work, of regulating the turns, of

67 Paul Krause, The Battle fo r H om estead 1880-1892: Politics, Culture, and
Steel, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992): 15-20.
68 ibid., 34-6.
69 Serrin, Homestead, 83-5.
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altering the machinery, in short, every detail of working the great
plant...[be] subject to the interference of some busy body
representing the Amalgamated Association.”71 The end result of
the Homestead Strike, like its many counterparts around the turn of
the century, signified a turn toward what many workers and
citizens viewed as a new form of slavery. The shift marked a new
political framework characterized by laborers’ economic and social
subservience to industrial capitalism.
Events like Homestead, although political in nature, had a
profound impact upon the male psyche. Senator John Palmer, an
Illinois Democrat, put it well in responding to the spectacle:
“Within my lifetime, I have seen marvelous changes. There was a
time when individualism was the universal rule and men lived
alone...because they could support themselves; but matters have
changed.”

Events like the Homestead Strike effectively broke

mens’ spirit, and revealed employers’ growing ability to “manage
their business to suit themselves.” As a result, the majority of men
were left to conclude that “the conditions of life [were] determined
by forces too large for them to battle.”72 Men still fought, but they

70 ibid., 90.
71 Figures listed are actual, not modem equivalents. James H. Bridge, The Inside
H istory o f the Carnegie Steel Company: A Romance o f M illions, (New York:
Am o Press, 1903): 296-315, 202.
72 Sen. John Palmer, Congressional Record, 52, pt.6, 5824-25; Margaret F.
Byington, Homestead: The H ouseholds o f a M ill Town, (Pittsburgh: University
Center for International Studies, 1974): 175.
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resisted more out of frustration than a belief that their resistance
was of meaningful consequence.
Aggressive responses to industrial capitalism, however,
were not limited to the working class. Men of the middle- and
upper-classes experienced their own set of tensions in confronting
the altered political framework of turn-of-the-century America,
namely, a fear of working-class unrest.

To counter signs of

growing restlessness on the part of laborers, the bourgeoisie sought
more subtle means of harnessing aggression to preserve their
advantage within society. The resulting emphasis upon force and
strenuousness fed a growing interest in organized youth sports like
boxing, baseball, and football.

73

Aside from instilling vigor in boys and young men,
competitive sports also helped reinforce bourgeois values of
discipline and productivity. When boys began competitive sports regardless of their class- they entered into an organized institution
that served as a metaphor for American “success.” Sports instilled
an appreciation for teamwork and individual excellence, skill
positions and grunts, comebacks and routs, and, most importantly,
winning and losing.

Regardless of the sport, only a minority

would excel and far fewer would reach the exclusive rank of
professional. Nonetheless, just by playing, the participant learned

73 Jackson Lears, No Place o f Grace: Antim odernism an d the Transformation o f
Am erican Culture, 1880-2000, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981): 107-8.

38

the virtues of both competition and subordination within a
hierarchical structure such as that espoused by capitalism.
Competitive sports provided an object lesson in the importance of
trying hard and -when your best is not enough- accepting defeat
gracefully.74 Organized sports thus became for the bourgeoisie,
among other things, a means o f social conditioning whereby
American males came to terms with, and accepted, their position in
society. For privileged males, then, it remained simply to justify
their lofty status by defeating their less skilled rivals in the socially
sanctioned media of the ring, the diamond, and the field.
The final decades of the nineteenth century witnessed
profound change in the political structure of America.

The

transformation began with the reformulation of democratic
principles by shrewd minds like William Graham Sumner that
found acceptance in the American legal tradition through persistent
efforts by men like Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field. Through
these challenges to the Jeffersonian tradition of American
democracy, a new conservatism emerged to justify industrial
capitalism’s demand for property rights at the expense of
individual honor and the public good.

With the courts’

endorsement, a new political framework established itself, evident
in men’s loss of identity to industrial capitalism.

Bereft of a

14 R. W. Connell, M asculinities, (Berkeley: University o f California Press,
1995): 35-6,
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climate conducive to individual honor, increasingly, working class
men embraced aggression in demonstrating their frustration with
the revised political order. Despite their aggressive tenor, events
like the Homestead Strike were destined to fail. In the process of
failing, however, the working class challenged upper- and middleclass men to identify alternatives such as organized sports, in part,
to channel the competitiveness of industrial capitalism toward
more socially” acceptable ends.

In short, the altered political

framework o f late-nineteenth century America produced

a

pervasive self-consciousness in men that effectively transformed
the calm confidence of mid-nineteenth century manliness to a more
frantic

masculinity

forged

by

conformity

to

unwelcome

expectations.

Female Assertion and Male Resistance
Men in the late-nineteenth century experienced a growing
loss of control evident in a post-frontier anxiety and a changing
political framework that undermined the erstwhile construction of
manliness. They responded through aggression, but their behavior
stemmed from an abiding insecurity that left them vulnerable, even
paranoid, in the wake of this transformation. I will now focus on
how women emerged at this time to further damage —albeit
unknowingly— the fragile ego of the American male. In making
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this point, I will likewise address how men resisted these assertions
through a more steadfast embrace of the masculine ideal.
Women in the final decade of the nineteenth century
lamented many of the same changes as men. Accordingly, they
devoted much of their efforts to reconciling modernism with
tradition.75

As

men

appeared

to

abandon

manliness

to

accommodate changes brought about by industrial capitalism,
women sought to revive its essential traits by advocating “a genteel
style of politics based on intelligence, morality, and selfrestraint.”76

In doing so, they helped unite much of what

democratic conservatism had divided; men of all classes rallied
under a common banner of masculinity. They demonstrated this
consensus, among other ways, by adopting new terms for deficient
masculinity like “sissy,” “pussy-foot,” and “stuffed shirt,” to
deplore women’s growing influence while reinforcing more
masculine standards o f behavior.77 For men to lose their honor
*

75 Chambers, Tyranny, xxii.
76 Hoganson, Am erican M anhood, 15. Clearly, not all women joined in filling
the void created by m en’s abdication of the manly ideal. However, the
emergence o f the “New Woman” as a fresh presence in U.S. politics and society
at the tum-of-the-century provides a meaningful stereotype that offers further
evidence o f m en’s changing perception o f women. For a more thorough
discussion o f the New Woman and her “threat to m en’s power and security,” see
Amaldo Testi, “The Gender of Reform Politics,” The Journal o f Am erican
History, vol. 81, (March 1995): 1520-4; The impetus o f the growing women’s
movement derived from attempts by women to “improve [their] status and
usefulness to society” by increasing their role in directing their public and
private destinies. Chambers, Tyranny o f Change, 1.
77 JohnHigham, Writing Am erican History, (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1970); 79-102.
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was one thing, but to have it restored by women was simply
unacceptable.
The growing assertiveness of women is evident in Charlotte
Perkins Gilman’s attempt to alter the discourse of civilization by
according women a greater role in civilization’s advance.
Prevailing wisdom rested civilization’s perfection on “elaborate
and

excessive”

differences

between

the

sexes

whereby

breadwinning husbands provided for their needy spouses. Gilman
viewed this as an inefficient arrangement.

Accordingly, she

proffered challenges to conventional gender roles by highlighting
the “evolutionary cost” of women’s dependence upon men.
Like other advocates of civilized progress, Gilman viewed
human evolution as a teleological process. Since perfection was
the all-important end, it was critical that civilized society do
everything in its power to achieve it.

Gilman believed that the

human objective was “progress [and] development” :
...w e are here, not merely to live, but to grow- not to be content
with lean savagery or fat barbarism or sordid semi-civilization, but
to toil on through the centuries, and build up the ever nobler forms
of life toward which social evolution tends. 8

For Gilman, denying women an active role in this project was to
answer the challenge with one of civilization’s arms tied behind its
back.
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In particular, Gilman challenged the notion of sexual
distinction as the principal mark of a civilized society. She looked
to secondary sex characteristics in nature -physical features like
“mane[s], comb[s], wattles, spurs, gorgeous color [and] superior
size”- to make her point.

Admitting that the presence o f these

traits allowed individual organisms to reproduce more readily than
others, Gilman sought to show how, conversely, their excess would
ultimately undermine the self-preservation of organisms as a
whole. For example, a peacock could tolerate a tail only so large
before that distinguishing feature became an impediment to its
primary goal of survival.

In short, sexual distinction required a

degree of moderation to be truly advantageous.

Having thus

borrowed from nature, Gilman brought her argument to the
discourse of the day by highlighting the limits of civilized society’s
obsession with sex-distinction. For Gilman, women in society, like
the over-plumed peacock in nature, were impaired by their sexual
excess.

79

Aside from Gilman’s divergence on the gender issue, her
project was not that distinguishable from Roosevelt’s and its
emphasis on millennialism and race. She differed only in rejecting
Roosevelt’s call for sexual distinction in advancing civilization.

78 Charlotte Perkins Stetson [Gilman], Women and Economics: A Study o f the
E conom ic Relation between M en and Women as a Factor in Social Evolution
(Boston: Small, Maynard, 1898): 207.
79 ibid., 30-4.
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For Gilman, the oversexed, civilized woman - “feeble and
clumsy”- embodied the devolutionary effect of women’s, and
hence civilization’s, unsung potential.

80

She believed the more

energy a culture devoted to sexual differentiation, the less there
remained for the more important cultural task of distinguishing the
“races.”81 Gilman argued that only civilized races could afford the
excess o f female indolence; however, by allowing it to persist,
“civilized races” risked their advantage by failing to harness their
full potential.
Not surprisingly, Gilman’s contribution to the civilization
discourse posed problems for men in maintaining their exclusive
role within it.

Her call for a higher female purpose held a

compelling logic that threatened men’s standing at the high point
of male

self-consciousness.

Therefore,

Gilman’s

project

demanded a sound rebuttal to preserve men’s standing in the
prevailing discourse. G. Stanley Hall, a prominent social theorist,
provided this timely response. And where Gilman viewed the
primary threat to civilization as an excessive femininity among
women, Hall countered by attributing the problem to a lack of
virility among men.
Hall was a professor of pedagogy and psychology who
devoted his life to the study of human development. He believed

80 ibid., 46.
81 Gilman, Women and Economics, 31-9, 58-9.
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in the inexorable advance of civilization under the stewardship of
white males, but feared middle-class men’s deficient “toughness
and strength” in realizing it.82 The final decade of the nineteenth
century witnessed a rise in upper- and middle-class women’s
influence. This emergence placed a growing number of women in
the public eye as volunteers and advocates for expanded suffrage,
0
-1

temperance, and the poor.

Women’s gains appeared to come at

the expense of men; this alone magnified Hall’s accomplishment.
For just as women seemed to corral what had been an elusive
civilization discourse, Hall opened a new gate by arguing that
civilization itself was to blame for men’s declining influence.
Hall popularized neurasthenics and recapitulation theory in
calling for men’s return to the primitive virtues of their ancestors.
As stated, men of the late- nineteenth century confronted an uneasy
intersection between manliness and masculinity. As middle-class
ideologies of honor and restraint became less appealing, the manly
ideal foundered.

Yet while it lost support in theory, it retained

influence in the everyday lives of men. Hall sought to change this.
Like his colleague George M. Beard, a pioneer in neurasthenics,
Hall believed the “increased pace and technological advancement
of modem civilization” had exhausted men’s “nervous force” by

82 Bederman, M anliness and Civilization, 43.
83 Chambers, Tyrrany, 33.
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holding their passions in excessive check.84

In a culture that

elevated the "labor of the brain” over “that of the muscles,” Hall
feared that turn-of-the-century men had weakened their bodies by
overcultivating their minds to meet the growing demands of
civilization.85 Society’s cultivation of the intellect at the expense
of the body had resulted in a drain of men’s vigor, rendering them
effeminate, feeble, and exhausted. Appalled at this development,
Hall sought a new method for raising middle-class boys with
enough strength to withstand civilization and its attendant decay.86
Hall tried to resolve the paradox of civilization and
neurasthenia by advocating recapitulation theory.
civilization

discourse

had

framed

society’s

The erstwhile
advance

in

dichotomous terms, pitting civilization against barbarism in
elevating whites above “inferior races.” But Hall’s understanding
of the

problems

facing

American men

led

him

to

the

uncomfortable conclusion that under such a framework, greater
civilization would ultimately lead to neurasthenic ruin.

Rather

than despair of this prospect, Hall took the debate in a different
direction.
continuum

Where his predecessors saw dichotomy, Hall saw a
between

savagery

and

civilization

capable

of

84 Bederman, M anliness and Civilization, 85-7.
85 Beard distinguished neurasthenia as a problem unique to overcivilization by
citing its disproportionate presence amongst those working at the “desk, pulpit,
and counting-room” than “in the shop or on the farm.” George M. Beard,
Am erican Nervousness: Its Causes and Consequences (New York: G.P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1881): 26.
86 Bederman, M anliness and Civilization, 95.
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replenishing men’s vigor. His project required intervention in the
earliest stages of male development.
Hall believed the passion of young boys —a vestige of all
men’s primitive past— represented the greatest hope for men in an
overcivilized world. He looked with dissatisfaction at the current
state of young boys:
Something is amiss with the lad of ten who is very good, studious,
industrious, thoughtful, altruistic, quiet, polite, respectful,
obedient, gentlemanly, [and] orderly...Such a boy is either under
vitalized and anemic...[or] a repressed, ...conventionalized
manikin [sic].87

For Hall, this pathetic plight was the result o f excessive social
programming at too early of an age. He maintained that the natural
exuberance of young boys warranted cultivation to instill savage
virtues such as physical strength, “feeling, emotion, and impulse,”
oo

to counter neurasthenia later m life.

In fostering this passion,

Hall instructed primary school teachers to promote the “halfanimal” nature of boys in the classroom and on the playground.
By thus transforming the principal mode of social conditioning,
young boys would receive an inoculation against the “monoton[y]
oq

and narrow[ness]” of civilized existence.

87 G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology,
Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education, 2 vols. (New
York: Appleton, 1904): 2: 453.
88 ibid., 2:648.
89 ibid., 2:452; G. Stanley Hall and Arthur Allin, “The Psychology o f Tickling,
Laughing, and the Comic,” Am erican Journal o f Psychology, vol. 9, (October
1897): 17.
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Hall’s intent was not to produce a nation of primitive boysturned savage men; it was quite the contrary.

Drawing upon

Darwin, Hall read into the development of each young boy the
whole o f human evolutionary history. It was precisely by allowing
boys to revisit the savagery of their ancestors in youth that they
could evolve from that primitive state throughout their lifetime to
become civilized adults. This regression, Hall contended, would
allow boys to rediscover the “missing links” of their distant past
and amass the necessary character to combat neurasthenia as
men. 90
Hall’s work with neurasthenia and recapitulation theory, as
stated, served to undermine the assertions of women, especially in
light o f Gilman’s recent challenge to the civilization discourse.91
But what, if anything, did it contribute to men’s uneasy perch
between manliness and masculinity?

The answer is complex.

While Hall admitted a measure of passion and aggressiveness to
the development of young boys, he seemed to retreat from the
masculine ideal by doing it in the name of more healthy civilized
men. Hall’s work provides an important beginning, but the full
answer to how men negotiated the manly-masculine divide lies in
the intricate politics of turn-of-the-century American imperialism.

90 Bedemian, M anliness and Civilization, 92-5; G. Stanley Hall, “Pedagogical
Methods in Sunday School Work,: Christian Register 74 (November 1895):
719-20.
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My introduction sheds brief light on the pressures President
McKinley faced in navigating the dilemmas, both political and
personal, preceding the Spanish-American War.

However, in

highlighting the context of his reluctant declaration of war, it
abstained from recognizing the gendered debate that complicated
his decision. The growing influence of women at the turn-of-thecentury posed unique political problems. In fact, it is difficult to
fully separate imperial policy from the emergent politics of gender
at that time.

In short, men faced a growing need to conceive

politics in terms of “honor” due to growing feminist sentiments.92
At the very least, the reality of this new political climate forced
politicians to present their policies in a manner conducive to
women’s growing influence. Men felt the pull of conflicting ideals
and hence the need to navigate this divide with a newfound
caution.
Jingoist imperialists like Senators Albert Beveridge and
Henry Cabot Lodge, resting securely in the masculinist camp,
viewed war in Cuba and the Philippines as an opportunity for

91 For a fitting sense o f how Hall’s recapitulation theory assaulted conventional
sensibilities by fostering boys’ primitive license, see “Dr. H all’s Ultra Views,”
Chicago E vening Post, 4 April 1899, 4.
92 For a thorough treatment of how gender politics “ground[ed] foreign policy
decisions” in the tum-of-the-century United States, see Kristin Hoganson’s
Fighting f o r A m erican M anhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the SpanishA m erican and Phillipine-American Wars, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1998). In it, Hoganson argues that conventional explanations o f U.S.
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“manufacturing]

manhood”

and

rekindling

“vigor”

amidst

*

*

perceptions of male degeneracy.

93

_

,

They seized upon concerns

regarding the strength of male character to champion empire
building as an opportunity to revive it. But while jingoist rhetoric
suggests their intent to elevate masculinity above a worn-out
tradition o f manliness, there seems to be sufficient evidence that
they needed to frame this desire in honorable terms.
In making the case for U.S. imperialism, many jingoists
drew upon analogies that elevated Americans’ sense of honor
above the arbitrationists’ calls for peaceful
resolution.94

Their motives likely rested with preventing the

“character of the nation” from falling “to the unmilitary sex,” but
this warranted disguise in the altered political climate of the late1890s. To reach the desired effect, the jingo press often portrayed
Cuba’s situation in chivalric terms.

Cuban women became

damsels in distress, requiring rescue by American knights, while
Cuban rebels served as paragons of honor —brave, fraternal, and
respectful— countering Spanish aggression, which sought to hold
them in “bondage for lust and brutality.”95 In short, by portraying

imperialism fail to account for the impact of gender politics upon the U.S.
decision to engage in these wars.
93 Albert Beveridge, The Young M an and the World, (New York: D. Appleton,
1905): 338-42.
94 It is worth noting that the feminists allied rather predictably with the
arbitrationists. Chambers, The Tyrrany o f Change, 221-2.
95 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Special Sorrows: The Diasporic Imagination o f Irish,
Polish, a nd Jewish Im m igrants in the United States, (Cambridge: Harvard
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imperialism in manly terms, jingoist illuminati were able to sell
their masculine project of strengthening male character to a nation
with a lingering insistence upon honor.
Despite the manly tenor many jingoists invoked, the overall
rhetoric o f U.S. imperialism admitted seemingly sharp contrast
between the manly and masculine ideals. Beveridge’s call for
American imperialism helps illustrate this point:
The question for the young men of this Republic to decide is
whether they will enlist with the Republican party, which is
harmonious with all those natural elements of youth, of progress
and o f power and whose foreign policy is the policy of American
advance, or with the Democratic party, which is at war with every
constructive development of our civilization and whose foreign
policy is the policy of American retreat.96
The challenge Beveridge posed laid bare the stakes of U.S:
imperialism for men. Whereas American men had once felt free to
decide matters by virtue of individual discretion and personal
principle, they now confronted a political climate that challenged
them collectively.

This marked a shift from the deliberate

character o f manliness, to the masculine imperative of proving
one’s self on the basis o f gender.

In this sense, the imperial

question played upon men’s self-consciousness to the point of
supplanting their private judgement.

University Press, 1995): 161; Grover Flint, M arching with Gomez, (Boston:
Lamson, Wolffe, 1898): 128.
96 Albert J. Beveridge, “The Young Men o f America,” address of Oct. 18, 1900,
Albert J. Beveridge Papers, LC, as quoted in Hoganson, Fighting fo r American
M anhood, 162.
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When hostilities in Cuba ended in July of 1898, an abiding
I

fear of male degeneracy served to justify America’s retention of
the Philippines. , But the realities o f war soon belied their
innocuous billing. Unfortunately for the jingoes, mounting disgust
with the methods used to suppress Filipino rebels saw their
emphasis upon manliness turned against them. Several problems
conspired against the jingoes’ rhetorical scheme.

The tropical

climate, in addition to promoting untold diseases, brought
perceptions o f indolence and sensuality, prompting fears o f “evils”
like prostitution, race-mixing, and outbreaks of venereal disease
among American soldiers. Likewise, the army’s harsh methods of
quashing the rebellion suggested a fall to barbarism.

Almost

overnight, the American presence in the Philippines deteriorated
from “a glorious opportunity to build manhood” to an unintended
path toward its destruction.97
In light of the mixed results of the imperial experiment, one
might wonder why the imperial thrust was not abandoned
altogether. The answer lies, in part, in the masculine ideal that had
taken hold in preceding decades as a response to frontier anxiety
and a revised political framework.

The tenuous hold o f men,

evident in their declining influence throughout the 80s and 90s,
prompted a sustained effort to retain some semblance of traditional

97 Goran Rystad. Am biguous Imperialism: Am erican Foreign Policy and
D om estic P olitics at the Turn o f the Century, (Sweden: Berlingska

power.

This self-consciousness prompted a headlong push, for

better or worse, toward a more dignified status for men in the new
national and international order.

While the Spanish- and

Philippine-American Wars were far from perfect, they were, after
all, victories. As such, they were harnessed to help reinforce the
otherwise declining position o f American men.
The

radical

psychoanalysis

of Alfred

Adler

sheds

additional light on men’s masculine embrace of U.S. imperialism.
Although his split with Freud came a decade in its wake, the fact
that his theory of masculinity initiated this break is noteworthy.

98

Adler began from the premise that all children, from the start,
experience an internal polarity between the masculine and
feminine. Because boys are relatively weak compared to adults,
this subordination cultivates their feminine character as a
counterbalance to the masculine.

As they develop, however, in

most contexts males learn a cultural preference for the masculine,
as the feminine is most often associated with weakness. Neurosis
follows as men reject their feminine character due to an abiding
fear of physical weakness and inferiority. In Adler’s terms, this
gives way to “masculine protest” as men “exaggerate the

Boktryckeriet, 1975): 23.
98 Adler and Freud parted ways in 1911 due, in part, to Adler’s disenchantment
with Freud’s “mechanistic” theories of repression. Adler thought Freud’s
Oedipus complex was merely a case in point of a larger dynamic o f male
neurosis, namely, “the masculine protest.” R.W. Connell, M asculinities
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1995): 16-7.
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masculine through aggression and restless striving for triumphs.”99
In the context of turn-of-the-century U.S. imperialism, psychology
and history converged rather seamlessly.

Jingoists played upon

male neurosis and “masculine protest” to promote U.S. expansion
while providing Adler a compelling case study in radical
psychoanalysis.
That the masculine ideal survived its near collapse at the
hands of imperialism is evident in how the U.S. resisted calls for
reform by maintaining its claims to the newly-acquired territories
of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Cuba following the
war.

Despite steadfast criticism from anti-imperialists, the U.S.

proceeded with its “aggrandizing national design.” Only after the
war effort did imperialists yield to anti-imperialist concerns that
foreigners were unfit for self-government and thus a danger to
American democracy. In doing so, prevailing attitudes of AngloSaxon superiority at home and abroad pre-empted calls for a just
resolution o f the political problems posed by U.S. expansion.
Rather than extend the rights of democracy to foreigners
brought under its compass, the U.S. kept them at arm’s length by

99 Alfred Adler, “Psychologie der Macht,” Gewalt und Gewaltlosigkeit, ed. F.
Kobler, (Zurich: Rotapfelverlag, 1928): 41-6, as discussed in R.W. Connell,
M asculinities (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1995): 16. In admitting
radical psychoanalysis to the issue of m en’s embrace of masculinity, I do not
wish to elevate it above its historical context. A critical point of Adler’s
analysis is that culture plays a significant role in associating the feminine with
weakness. I would argue that as honor lost out to aggression in the final decades
o f the nineteenth century, the transformation afflicted the male subconscious.
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extending its demands for labor, markets, and hegemony without
admitting territorial inhabitants as “participants] in the conduct of
their governm ents].” As such, imperial policy embraced the
longstanding prejudice that savage races could only be “uplifted” .
and “civilized” through prolonged and patient exposure to their
“racial superiors.”100

For the majority of American men, the

newly tapped colonies could be of use to America without
becoming truly American.101
The status of foreigners following the Spanish-American
War reveals the emptiness of the manly rhetoric that fed U.S.
imperialism. The new territories became, in effect, mere bases of
extraction for natural resources and cheap labor capable of feeding
aggressive American interests.102 Jingoists were unwilling to risk
political clout by defending the lofty ideals originally put forth to
sell U.S. expansion. In this sense, the plight of foreigners in U.S.
territories revealed how both the imperial and anti-imperial camps
came under the definitive spell of masculinity.

As America

pursued its imperial ambitions, it abandoned much of the discipline
and restraint that ’ accompanied earlier policy considerations.

To compensate for their perceived inadequacy, men harnessed masculinity as a
means to discounting the feminine in both themselves and their culture.
100 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters
Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917. (New York: Hill and Wang,
2000): 225.
101 Phelps Whitmarsh, “The Men Behind the Plow,” O utlook 66, Dec. 15, 1900,
932-35.
102 ibid., 40.
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While the decision to do so brought forth a host of unhappy results,
American men could overlook these so long as they found
consolation in this trade-off. M en’s honor suffered but they had
already learned the limits of manliness. Accordingly, they further
embraced a masculine construction of manhood capable of
reasserting the Control that manliness no longer provided.
In short, the close of the nineteenth century featured
American men at a crossroads. Traditional standards of manhood,
emphasizing honor and virtue, were ill suited to the new challenges
facing men. Women asserted their growing influence, in part, to
compensate

for men’s abdication

of traditional

manliness.

Charlotte Perkins Gilman reinforced this trend by challenging the
discourse of civilization to harness women’s overlooked potential.
Threatened by this prospect, men sought fresh alternatives for
maintaining their traditional power. G. Stanley Hall seized upon
this opportunity to resolve the paradox of civilization and
“neurasthenia” by promoting the primitive impulses of boys. For
its part, U.S. imperialism revealed the gendered nature of turn-ofthe-century politics. And while expansion posed new problems, it
granted men greater control as consolation for their diminished
place in society.

Men embraced imperialism, in part, as an

opportunity to restore their damaged egos and retain a semblance
of their traditional cultural authority.
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Asserting themselves as

such, men effectively countered the challenges of women while
affirming their preference for masculinity as the defining standard
of American manhood.

Poor William McKinley; how could he have known?

His

country had changed so much in a single generation, no wonder he
seemed overwhelmed by the situation he confronted.

The very

standards of honor and restraint that had served him so well in his
rise to power became, rather abruptly, liabilities to effective
leadership.

Late-nineteenth century men faced new challenges,

which demanded new standards of manhood. The closing of the
frontier had forced them to

confront the limits of their

independence and re-conceive their relationship to the country as a
whole. Not surprisingly, they adapted to this change by trying to
retain as much of their traditional authority as possible; distinctions
of race, class and gender thus pervaded this transformation.
Industrial capitalism emerged alongside democratic conservatism
to turn these distinctions against the majority of men by elevating
property rights above the inherent value of the individual. Men
now confronted a new political climate that rendered them selfconscious,

either as subjects or beneficiaries of industrial

capitalism.

Women employed, their newfound influence to

denounce mounting obstacles to traditional manhood. But rather

than join forces with women and other less powerful social groups,
men proceeded along the path of distinction in an effort to console
their damaged egos.

Imperialism promised to restore their

tarnished manhood, but only with assaults upon their honor.
Nonetheless, men embraced it, warts and all, in an attempt to
prevail amidst a backdrop of loss. In doing so, men solidified their
turn from a manly ideal of restraint and honor toward a masculine
ideal of aggression in late-nineteenth century America.
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